Norton sub Hamdon
Local History Society
The War Dead of Norton sub Hamdon, Somerset
Ernest Ralph Johnson
Quartermaster Sergeant, No. 277, 7th Battalion, The King’s Royal Rifle Corps.
Unfortunately, although they still exist, Ernest’s service records are quite badly damaged by fire and water as well as faded by time. Consequently many of the details are missing or impossible to decipher. This is a shame as many important facts are still unknown and there are, therefore, many gaps in our knowledge of Ernest and his time with the colours.
One of the first entries on the service records states that he was a resident of Norton sub Hamdon and it is known that most of the local men joining the army naturally gravitated to the Somerset Light Infantry. However, we find Ernest enlisting in the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, a Regiment with strong links to Hampshire. Indeed the 7th Battalion, to which Ernest was attached, was formed in Winchester on 19th August 1914 and it would have been Winchester that Ernest travelled to in order to sign up and where, most probably, his training began. And why did he join so soon after the beginning of hostilities when the war was still a war of movement and had not got bogged down in trench warfare with the resulting horrendous casualties? It was possible he had been a member of the Territorial Army answering the call up. However, his signed statement on enlistment shows that he had no previous military experience. It could only have been patriotism that led Ernest to join the army so early in the war.
His service records list him as being a hospital attendant, yet his brother Stan, who lived in Norton until his death in December 2000, thought that Ernest had been in service with a gentleman living in Alresford, Hampshire. The latter would seem the most likely for a number of reasons. Firstly, as already stated, he joined a Regiment with a Hampshire link. Secondly he married a girl from Alresford, and thirdly his family remained in Alresford or the surrounding areas up to and probably beyond the date of his death rather than move to Ernest’s home village which would have been natural if he had been resident there on enlistment.
Unmarried at the time of enlistment Ernest was 23 years old ( & 30 days according to the entry on his service record). He is described as 5’ 9 ¾ ins tall, with a 36 ¼ ins chest (with 3 ¼ ins expansion). He had a fair complexion, blue eyes and light brown hair. He is simply recorded as C of E.
On the 9th of September 1914 Ernest was posted to a training camp but the documents do not state which one. We do know that on 17th November 1914 he married Esme Francis Lilian Guy at Bishops Sutton, which is south of Bristol near to the Chew Valley Lake. From this we can see that Ernest and Esme must have been courting for some time. We also know that at this time Esme was resident in Alresford adding to the theory that Ernest must have been also living in Alresford for him to have courted her and proposed to her. The place of marriage also suggests that Ernest was based nearby for training and although he received permission to marry he was not allowed to return to either of their home villages for the ceremony.
His wife, who he called Lilly, gave birth to a daughter, Esme Florence Mary, on 16th October 1915. (Daughter Esme lived until about 1995).
Attached to the 41st Brigade of the 14th (Light) Division the 7th Battalion King’s Royal Rifles took part in many of the major engagements of the war. The one we will look at more closely is the 3rd Battle of Ypres also known as Passchendale. Which took place from 31st July 1917 until 6th November 1917 costing the Allies 250,000 casualties including Ernest Ralph Johnson. The following is a brief description of the action that cost so many lives.
Passchendale was the battle that should never have been fought. The same could have been said for many of the offensives of the Great War for the generals rarely learnt the lessons despite the loss of lives.
Pressurised by the French to launch an offensive against the German lines in order to relieve the continual German pressure against their defences, and convinced that the Allies needed to break through to Ostende and Zeebruge to destroy the U boat pens, Haig planned to advance on a four and a half mile front across low lying land. There was some justification for the concerns of those back at home regarding the loss of shipping to U boat packs and the fears that continued attrition of essential supplies would severely limit the Allies ability to continue the fight into the new year. A breakthrough would allow the Allies to outflank the Germans and threaten the enemy’s industrial heartland in the Ruhr. In addition, by capturing the high ridge of land at Passchendale that dominated the salient of Ypres, pressure would be taken off the British troops allowing them to over winter in relative peace and safety. Persuaded by these arguments Haig was about to send four hundred thousand British and Commonwealth soldiers to their deaths or serious injury.
The battlefields of Ypres consisted mainly of low-lying wetlands drained by an intricate network of dykes and culverts cut and dug over hundreds of years. Interspersed amongst these lowland areas were prominent heights that were occupied by the enemy and gave them vantage points over the Allies’ trenches allowing them to see all strategic Allied troop and supply movements.
In two weeks of continual bombardment the drainage system was destroyed turning the land into a quagmire of thick cloying mud. The average rainfall for the beginning of August in the area should have been 8 mm. In fact 76 mm fell in just four days. Haig had been warned by his engineers that the land would not withstand the effects of the bombardment, that it would turn the ground in front of the German trenches into a mud bath so thick that the movement of infantry would be slow and very difficult, and that of the tanks almost impossible. Confident to the point of arrogance, Haig refused to listen to all the advice.
The bombardment was designed to destroy the German lines allowing the Allies to sweep across no man’s land unopposed. However, the Germans had developed tactics that would reduce their casualties and still allow them to defend their trenches. They maintained their forward defences by placing artillery in protected emplacements and machine guns in shellproof bunkers. In addition small pockets of troops were left in the trenches to bolster the artillery and machine guns. By far the bulk of their troops were kept to the rear in shellproof bunkers from where they could be brought forward to counter-attack the remains of the attacking force before they could consolidate their gains. Despite the Allies firing four million shells the Germans were well prepared for the Allied attack. In fact, because of poor security amongst the Allies, the Germans knew of the proposed offensive and had taken their counter measures in good time. Four days before the battle was due to commence they had withdrawn the bulk of their front line troops back to the Passchendale Ridge.
Apart from this defence in depth, known as the Hindenberg Line, the German artillery was superior to that of the British; it had longer range, was more accurate and the ammunition was more likely to detonate on impact. Amongst the ammunition available to the Germans were mustard gas shells, containing a liquid that caused the skin to blister and seriously damaged the eyes.The command of the opening phases of the offensive was given to Sir Hugh Gough. Aged 47, Gough, a naturally aggressive man, was a thrusting commander eager to prove his mettle. His main weapon was his 5th Army. At the end of the first day, Gough’s troops were 500 yards forward on the left of the line and two miles on the right. This was nowhere near the expected four-mile advance Haig had counted on. Half the tanks were bogged down while the rest proved useless. Gunner William ‘Mac’ Francis, 91686, ‘E’ (5th) Battalion Tank Corps was forced to abandon his tank, ‘Enchantress’, whilst attacking pillboxes near Zannebeke and St. Julien villages, when it became bogged down in the mud. The crew tried in vain to free the tank from the quagmire and were forced to retreat to the rear of the lines. When the salvage corps went forward to recover the tank two or three days later only two feet of the tank was visible above the mud.
The offensive had started with an attack against the Pilkem Ridge, north east of Ypres. After Pilkem Ridge they attacked Gheluvelt. The first day’s attack cost the British 15-25000 casualties. To make matters worse it started to rain.
Frustrated by the losses and the failure to meet the deadlines, Haig replaced Gough with Plumer, a cautious commander, thus combining the 2nd & 5th Armies. For three weeks Plumer reorganised his army, during which time they suffered a further 16000 casualties inflicted on them by German guns commanded by spotters on the strategic high ground held by the enemy. Whilst Plumer planned, the fighting became a series of small savage struggles. Inverness Wood, no bigger than a small copse, changed hands nineteen times.
Two more attacks were made in August. Both ended in failure and with huge loss of life. By 21st August the British had suffered 68000 casualties. One consolation was the relative dryness of August and September, allowing the Allies to advance three miles.
The mud was so thick that it could take five hours to cover one mile. Pack animals died of exhaustion whilst bringing up supplies. It needed twelve men to carry one stretcher from the forward lines to the dressing stations. Men who fell into the mud were often never seen again.
On the 25th September the Anzacs attacked Polygon Wood, advancing 1000 yards along a five-mile front. The wood was partially cleared and the village of Zonnebeke occupied. This 1000 yards cost 17000 casualties on both sides.
Between 12 – 14th October the Anzacs captured Broodseine, which formed part of the Passchendale Ridge. In addition Poecapelle and Gravenstafel fell to the Allies. On 9th October 9000 men advanced to secure the high ground beyond Poelcapelle. They were met by a sea of mud, barbed wire and prepared machine gun positions. A rush to Passchendale Ridge followed this on 12th October by the Anzacs. They advanced 100 yards suffering huge casualties. On October 26th the Canadians advanced again against the Passchendale Ridge suffering 12000 casualties. Again the Canadians attacked the Ridge on 30th October advancing to within 500 yards of the top. Eventually the Canadians captured the Ridge on 6th November.
In Italy the Austrians and the Germans broke the Italian line. Using this distraction as an excuse to halt the carnage of Passchendale, Lloyd George withdrew five divisions from the BEF to bolster the Italian line, thus effectively stopping Haig’s offensive.
The whole offensive cost the Allies 250000 casualties for a gain of five miles.
Although Ernest’s service records show the cause of his death and the location they are too faded to be of any use. We have to turn to the 7th battalion’s War Records for information. These would have been compiled from the battalion’s war diary, which was written up daily even on active service. The following is an extract from the War records for August 1917.
The average strength of the Battalion during July was: Officers, 36. Other ranks, 959.
The first fortnight of August we remained at Frontier Camp and on the 15th moved to Dickebusch.
After the unsuccessful attack by other Divisions on Inverness and Glencorse Woods we moved into the reserve line at Zillebeke Bund; the day following we took over the support trenches near the Menin Road with the 7th Rifle Brigade on our right and the 42nd Infantry Brigade on our left.
The line was in a very bad state after the recent heavy fighting, the approaches being very difficult and the whole area much shelled. There was no infantry action during the tour and attention was concentrated on improving the trenches.
We were relieved on the 20th and then followed a period of moves at short notice due to the course of the operations. On the 22nd we sent to Chateau Segard, then back again to Dickebusch, and the following morning we were hustled off in motor lorries to the Ecole, Ypres, owing to a successful German counterattack; finally, on the 24th, we were once more back in Dickebusch and took over the same line under the orders of the 43rd Brigade. The situation there was unchanged, and we still held the important ridge that the Germans were so anxious to get back owing to its great command of the country behind our lines.
Strong patrols were sent out to see if any advance was possible, but it was found that the Germans were holding the trenches too strongly, so the following night, the 24th, in conjunction with the Battalions on our flanks, we established a line of strong posts. As a result of this activity the Germans came at us with some determination early on the 26th, but the attack was repulsed, B Company suffering heavily, 2nd Lieut. A. J. Hooper being killed, Captain P. K. Howarth and C. S. M. Smith wounded.
The same evening we received orders to make a combined attack with the Battalions on our flanks, the Tanks to assist, at dawn the following day. Owing, however, to heavy rain and the bad condition of the soil the attack did not take place.
On the evening of the 27th we were on the point of being relieved, in fact, the advance officers of the 23rd Division had arrived, when the Germans put down a very heavy barrage, and this was followed by a general attack on the ridge. This was repulsed, and the relief proceeded quietly. The Battalion moved back to Dickebusch and the following day to billets in Meteren, where the last days of the month were occupied in cleaning up and reorganising.
Besides the casualties already mentioned during this tour, 2nd Lieuts. G.E.Pullenger, M.C. and H.G.Barnes were wounded; 16 other ranks killed; 71 wounded; 6 missing.
The Battalion was now in rest, and moved into the 8th Corps area on September 2nd, to Waterloo Camp, and then onto Neuve Eglise on the 5th, which it was understood was to be our permanent billets for the winter. The Division took over the line east of Messines with one brigade in the firing line.
On the 12th we moved up into support. Movement in daylight was very restricted, but a very fine view was obtained of the towns in the rear of the German lines. There was very little infantry activity, but the uncomfortable proximity of some of our own batteries caused us a good deal of annoyance. We relieved the 8th R.B. on the 16th in the front line near Blauweport Beek, and found it in bad condition, with very inadequate reserve and support lines.
During this tour our artillery were very industrious in connection with operations further north. The 7th R.B. on our right carried out a successful raid, B Company cooperating and drawing a good deal of fire.
Our casualties during this tour were, 2nd Lieut. W.O.Dring and 19 other ranks wounded.
We were relieved on the 20th and spent the remainder of September quietly in billets at Neuve Eglise.
We were now in Divisional Reserve, and, expecting that Neuve Eglise would be our winter quarters, expended a good deal of time and trouble making ourselves comfortable. Somebody must have got wind of this, as on the 6th Oct. we were moved to good huts in Reninghelst, and three days later again found ourselves in Dickebusch Trenches, the 4th Middlesex being on our right and the 7th R.B. on our left.
This tour was most unpleasant: communications, especially to the rear, were very difficult, and the Menin Road, which was the chief approach, was freely shelled. The Battalion suffered a severe loss in the death of three C.Q.M.S - Ellis, Steward and Johnson; these Warrant Officers were amongst the oldest members of the Battalion, and had done splendid work. R.S.M. Oxley was also severely wounded. These casualties occurred through a shell landing on the dump, a most wretched piece of ill luck.
We had a considerable amount of sickness during the tour, owing to trench feet caused by the bad conditions and the impossibility of getting thigh boots and hot food.
There was one bright spot in an otherwise unlucky tour, our men had plenty of opportunities for getting a bit of their own back on the sniping line, and took them, to their immense delight.
Our casualties during the six days were, 27 O.R. killed and 59 wounded, 4 missing.
We were relieved on the 16th and moved to camp at Ridgewood, spending two days in cleaning up and reorganising the Battalion. On the 18th, Lieut.-Colonel G.A.P.Rennie, D.S.O, who had raised the Battalion in 1914, and with the exception of six months commanded it throughout, left to take command of the 146th Infantry Brigade, a well deserved promotion.
Ernest had only been wounded by the shell and was taken to the first of the treatment stations known as Regimental Aid Posts. The chart below indicates the system of casualty handling from the frontline back to Britain. Unfortunately for Ernest he never made it to Britain.
The Battalion War Records do not give the date of the incident in which Ernest was wounded but we do know from other sources that he died in a Back Areas Clearing Hospital at 0630 hours on 16th October 1917 of wounds to the abdomen. Ironically it was his daughter Esme’s second birthday.
Below I have reproduced three documents that relate to the death of Ernest.
Lijssenthoek Cemetery, in which Ernest Johnson rests, lies on the route of the old railway line between Hazebrouk and Poperinghe. The line at this point was just one small section of the main railway line that ran from the coastal ports to the battlefields in Flanders and formed an important staging post for the machinery of war. It was a transit station for men and supplies flowing into the frontline and for those men escaping from the horrors of the trenches.
Just as importantly it was the route back to ‘Blighty’ for all the brave men, and in some cases women, wounded in battle or suffering from illness brought on by the privations of trench warfare.
Consequently, a major hospital developed around this transport bridgehead, close to an area known as ‘Remy Sidings’. The area had first been used by the French as a Hospital d’Evacuation but was turned over to the British in the June of 1915.
Although the area was safe from long range artillery shelling the hospital did come under fire from German aircraft and it was during these raids that a number of female nurses were killed or wounded.
Lissenthoek Cemetery contains the bodies of 10770 casualties, mainly British but with a small number of French and German soldiers. Most of the dead died in the hospitals as a result of their wounds.
On the 19th February 1918 Lilly received a package containing Ernest’s belongings. They consisted of:-
1 x Haversack 1 x Watch 1 x Disc (probably an identity disc)
1 x Bundle of photographs 1 x Photocase 1 x Cigarette case
1 x Knife 1 x Notebook 1 x Purse
1 x Tobacco pouch 1 x Post office savings book 1 x 19ct gold ring
2 x 5 mark notes
Posthumously Ernest was awarded the 1914 – 1915 Star, The British War Medal (1914 – 1918) and The Victory Medal.
Finally, on 29th April 1918 Lilly received a War Widow’s Pension of 22/6d a week.
Bibliography
Firstly I am most grateful to the pupils and teachers of Norton sub Hamdon Primary School (1988) who carried out some remarkable research. They were even able to correct the official records, for the Regiment believed that Ernest had no known grave but now record him as buried in Lissenthoek Cemetery. I am also indebted to them for most of the original documents that are reproduced in this article.
Colonel I H Causland, archivists of the Royal Green jackets Museum at Winchester for supplying me with details from the 7th Battalion’s War Records.
The Public Records Office for Ernest’s Service Records.
Mr Cecil Gillman for the loan of the 1933 book ‘The First World War’, a pictorial history of the war.
‘Passchendaele. The Fight for the Village. Ypres’ by Nigeel Cave
‘Cameos of the Western Front. Salient Points One. Ypres Sector 1914 – 18’ by Tony Spagnoly and Ted Smith
‘Stalemate! Great Trench Warfare Battles’ by J. H. Johnson
Various articles in the magazine ‘Battlefield’s Review’.